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CHASING CAUSATION: THE FOURTH 
CIRCUIT’S AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 
ACT DECISION AND PROPER CAUSATION 
STANDARDS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the enactment of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990 (the “ADA”) twenty years ago,1 the question of what causation 
standard is required for discrimination claims has created 
disagreement among lower courts. Some courts require that a 
“motivating factor” standard must be met, meaning a plaintiff need 
demonstrate only that prohibited discrimination contributed to the 
employer’s decision.2 Other courts employ a “but-for” causation 
standard, which necessitates a showing that but for a plaintiff’s 
disability she would not have been fired.3 Recently, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals became the first circuit to analyze which standard 
must be adopted under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act of 2008,4 which prohibits discrimination “on the 
basis of” disability.5 
In Gentry v. East West Partners Management Co.,6 the Fourth 
Circuit held that the ADA mandated application of the more 
stringent “but-for” causation standard,7 meaning a plaintiff must 
prove that but for her disability, the employer would not have taken 
 
 * © 2017 Adrianna G. Sarrimanolis. 
 1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§	12101–
12213 (2012)). 
 2. Johnathan R. Mook, Fourth Circuit Adopts “But-For” Causation for ADAAA 
Claims, 16-5 Bender’s Lab. & Emp. Bull. (MB) 03 (May 1, 2016) (explaining that under a 
‘motivating factor’ standard, “to establish liability, a plaintiff need demonstrate only that 
prohibited discrimination contributed to the employer’s decision.”). 
 3. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
266 (5th ed. 1984) (defining but-for causation as: “[t]he defendant’s conduct is a cause of 
the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the 
defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without 
it.”). 
 4. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§	12101–12213 (2012)). 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2012). In this Recent Development, “the ADA” refers to 
both the original 1990 Act and the 2008 Amendments, as they are applied as one body of 
law. 
 6. 816 F.3d 228 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 7. See infra Part II. 
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adverse employment action against her.8 The court reasoned that 
Supreme Court precedent, prior decisions by other circuit courts, and 
the legislative history of the ADA all support the conclusion that the 
“on the basis of” language suggests a “but-for” causation 
requirement.9 
This Recent Development argues that the “but-for” causation 
standard used by the Fourth Circuit is the incorrect standard and, 
instead, proposes using the “motivating factor” standard. The 
argument focuses on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning for its decision in 
Gentry by examining the text of the ADA, the legislative history of 
the ADA, and relevant decisions of the Supreme Court and other 
circuits. 
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly discusses the 
history of the ADA causation standards with a specific focus on how 
the standards have developed and changed over the last twenty years. 
Part II provides the factual background for the Fourth Circuit’s 
adoption of a “but-for” causation standard. Part III analyzes and then 
explains why the “but-for” causation standard is not the proper 
standard a plaintiff must meet to assert a claim of discrimination by 
looking to the text and history of the ADA and relevant decisions of 
the Supreme Court and other circuits. Part IV examines the policy 
outcome when using the “but-for” causation standard and the 
negative impacts it has on implementing the purpose of the ADA. 
I.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF CAUSATION STANDARDS AND THE ADA 
The ADA was enacted in 1990 “[t]o establish a clear and 
comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of 
disability.”10 Especially in a context as “critical” as employment, 
individuals with disabilities were seen as pervasively disadvantaged 
through “outright intentional exclusion[;] the discriminatory effects of 
.	.	. communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure 
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary 
qualification standards and criteria, segregation, and relegation to 
lesser .	.	. benefits, jobs, or other opportunities.”11 The ADA was 
therefore created with the intent to both remedy this discrimination, 
 
 8. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235. 
 9. Id. at 235–36. 
 10. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327, 327 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§	12101–12213 (2012)). 
 11. Id. §2(a)(3), (5). 
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and to “assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent 
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”12 
Originally, to set forth a viable claim under section 102(a) of the 
1990 ADA, a disabled job applicant or employee had to show that an 
adverse employment action was taken against her “because of the 
disability of such individual.”13 This language mirrored the language 
in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), which stated 
that it was an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer to 
discriminate against any individual “because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin.”14 
Interpretations of the “because of” language in Title VII helped 
establish the original standard applied in ADA cases. In the seminal 
case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,15 the United States Supreme Court 
dictated the causation standard associated with the “because of” 
language in Title VII.16 Despite the Court’s inability to form a 
majority, six justices agreed that in a status-based discrimination case 
under Title VII, a plaintiff could prevail if he could show that one of 
the prohibited traits was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in the 
employer’s decision.17 Because the decision involved language 
identical to that of the ADA, lower courts began applying the 
motivating factor causation standard to discrimination claims brought 
under the ADA after its enactment one year later.18 
Two years after Price Waterhouse was decided, Congress passed 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, amending Title VII to codify the new 
causation framework dictated by the Supreme Court.19 The new 
provision stated that an “unlawful employment practice is established 
when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
practice.”20 
 
 12. Id. §	2(a)(8). 
 13. Id. §	102(a). 
 14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §	703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(a) (1964)) (emphasis added). 
 15. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 16. Id. at 239–40. 
 17. See id. at 241. 
 18. See McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We 
hold that the ‘because of’ component of the ADA liability standard imposes no more 
restrictive standard than the ordinary, everyday meaning of the words would be 
understood to imply. In everyday usage, ‘because of’ conveys the idea of a factor that 
made a difference in the outcome.”). 
 19. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §	107(a), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2 (2012). 
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
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This statutory change, however, actually led to more 
interpretational confusion in lower courts regarding causation 
standards. In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,21 the Supreme 
Court held that Title VII’s “motivating factor” standard, which 
provides that “an unlawful employment practice is established when 
the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice,”22 could not be 
carried over to claims brought under the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (the “ADEA”),23 which prohibits employers from 
“discriminat[ing] against any individual .	.	. because of such 
individual’s age.”24 
Unsurprisingly, this decision led to conflict among lower courts 
as they struggled to determine what this meant for claims brought 
under the ADA, which also mirrored the “because of” language of 
the ADEA.25 Based on Gross, a number of circuit courts held that the 
motivating factor standard would no longer apply to ADA claims.26 
Instead, in order to state a viable claim of disability discrimination, a 
plaintiff would have to apply the more stringent “but-for” causation 
standard.27 
However, even before Gross, the ADA causation standard was 
in a constant state of flux due to changes to the ADA. In 2008, 
Congress amended the ADA.28 The most notable change to the 
 
 21. 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(m) (2012). 
 23. The ADEA referenced in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. is the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§	621–634 (2012). See Gross, 557 
U.S. at 169. This Act deems it unlawful for an employer to “fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to 
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such 
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. §	623(a)(1). The “because of” language in the ADEA is the 
same language used in the ADA, causing some courts to hold that the treatment of one act 
must mirror the treatment of the other. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. 
L. No. 101-336, §	102(a), 104 Stat. 327, 331–32. 
 24. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting 29 U.S.C. §	623(a)(1)). 
 25. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 §	102(a) (“No covered entity shall 
discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual .	.	.	.”). 
 26. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(“[W]e see no reason to insert the one addendum (‘solely’) or the other (‘a motivating 
factor’) into the ADA.”); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 957 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“The ADA did not authorize mixed-motive disability discrimination claim.”). 
 27. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 312; Serwatka, 591 F. 3d at 957. 
 28. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. §§	12101–12213 (2012)). Congress amended the ADA in response to a 
number of Supreme Court cases that were narrowly defining what constituted a disability 
95 N.C. L. REV. 1784 (2017) 
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ADA, for purposes of this Recent Development, was the change in 
the language in §	102. While the original 1990 text employed the same 
“because of” language found in Title VII, the 2008 amendment 
modified the text to prevent discrimination “on the basis of” the 
disability.29 Thus, this pivotal change in language resulted in the need 
for a new analysis of what causation standard the ADA requires. 
Eight years later, with its decision in Gentry, the Fourth Circuit 
became the first circuit court to address what the appropriate 
causation standard should be given the new language of the ADA,30 
and it held that the “but-for” causation standard applied to ADA 
claims.31 
II.  GENTRY V. EAST WEST PARTNERS MANAGEMENT CO. 
The Fourth Circuit had the opportunity to evaluate the ADA 
causation standard issue when considering Judith Gentry’s challenge 
to a district court’s jury instructions under the ADA.32 Gentry sued 
her employers Maggie Valley and East West for disability 
discrimination under the ADA, among other violations.33 She claimed 
she was terminated because of an ankle injury she had sustained while 
on the job.34 The Western District of North Carolina instructed the 
jury that Gentry must be able to demonstrate that her disability was 
the but-for cause of her termination in order to establish a claim of 
discrimination under the ADA.35 Accordingly, the jury found for 
Maggie Valley and East West on the disability discrimination claims 
 
under the act. See generally Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 
(2002) (holding that terms “substantially” and “major” in the definition of disability under 
the ADA must be “interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as 
disabled”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (holding that the 
coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability needs to be narrowly 
construed). Congress intended the amendments to force courts to “carry out the ADA’s 
objectives of providing ‘a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination’ and ‘clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination’ by reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the 
ADA.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008 §	2(b)(1). 
 29. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 §	5(a). 
 30. Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 31. Id. at 235. 
 32. Id. at 233. 
 33. Id. at 232–33. The other violations Gentry alleged were sex discrimination under 
Title VII and North Carolina common law and retaliation for pursuing a workers’ 
compensation claim in violation of North Carolina law. Id. 
 34. Id. at 232. 
 35. Id. at 233. 
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because it did not find that but for Gentry’s disability she would not 
have been fired.36 
On appeal, Gentry argued that the district court had improperly 
instructed the jury on the causation standard for disability 
discrimination claims under the ADA.37 She argued the jury should 
have adopted the “motivating factor” causation standard of Title VII 
instead of the “but-for” standard used.38 Under the “motivating 
factor” standard, an unlawful employment action is established when 
the complainant demonstrates that her disability was a “motivating 
factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also 
motivated the practice.”39 However, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s jury instructions, finding that a “but-for” causation 
standard is the proper standard for a plaintiff to establish a viable 
claim of discrimination under the ADA.40 
The Fourth Circuit came to this conclusion despite the language 
change in the 2008 amendments to the ADA, asserting that the new 
“on the basis of” language was essentially identical to the removed 
“because of” language.41 Although the Fourth Circuit was the first 
circuit to decide the causation standard under the new ADA 
language, it closely followed several previous Supreme Court and 
other circuit court decisions, reasoning that such precedents “dictate[] 
the outcome.”42 
The Fourth Circuit also focused on the text and legislative 
history of the ADA, stating that such language “calls for a ‘but-for’ 
causation standard” and the legislative history “does not suggest that 
‘on the basis of’ was intended to mean something other than ‘but-for’ 
causation.”43 Although the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that this 
causation standard set a higher bar for plaintiffs, it nonetheless found 
that the legislative history of the ADA “suggests the language was 
changed to decrease the emphasis on whether a person is disabled, 
not to lower the causation standard.”44 
 
 36. Id. at 231. 
 37. Id. at 233. 
 38. Id. at 235. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-2(m) (2012). 
 40. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234. 
 41. Id. at 235–36. 
 42. Id. at 234. 
 43. Id. at 235–36. 
 44. Id. at 236. 
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III.  ANALYSIS OF THE “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION STANDARD 
The Fourth Circuit’s rationale for adopting the “but-for” 
causation standard focused on three main conclusions: (1) the ADA’s 
“on the basis of” disability language calls for using a “but-for” 
causation standard; (2) the legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of the ADA and its 2008 amendment leads to the 
conclusion that the change in language to “on the basis of disability” 
was not intended to establish a “motivating factor” causation 
standard; and (3) looking to the text of the ADA, there is no text that 
“provide[s] that a violation occurs when an employer acts with mixed 
motives.”45 Through this analysis, the Fourth Circuit became the first 
circuit court to decide that “on the basis of” disability entails a “but-
for” causation standard. 
A. “On the Basis of” Disability Textual Analysis 
While other circuits have interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Gross as signifying that a “but-for” causation standard 
must be applied to ADA discrimination claims, with its decision in 
Gentry, the Fourth Circuit became the first—and only—circuit to 
make such a holding when interpreting the ADA’s “on the basis of” 
language.46 
Congress’s 2008 amendments to the ADA included a change in 
the language used in section	102 providing the “General Rule” for 
discrimination.47 Prior to 2008, the ADA stated: “No covered entity 
shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
because of the disability of such individual .	.	.	.”48 The 2008 
amendments to the ADA changed this language to read that one shall 
not “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability.”49 
Because the amendment to the text of the statute was the 
impetus for Gentry, the textual difference was the Fourth Circuit’s 
first consideration. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit held that there was 
“no meaningful textual difference” between “because of” and “on the 
 
 45. Id. at 235–36. 
 46. See Mook, supra note 2; see also Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 
312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 959 (7th 
Cir. 2010). 
 47. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §	5(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	12112 (2012)). 
 48. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §	102(a), 104 Stat. 
327, 331. 
 49. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 §	5(a). 
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basis of.”50 The court looked to the New Oxford American and 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary definitions of “basis”51 and determined 
that a “basis” is merely the “justification for or reasoning behind 
something.”52 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit claimed the “on the basis 
of” language exactly mirrored the previous “because of” language.53 
However, when looking at the full definition of “basis” provided 
by Merriam-Webster online, it is defined as “the bottom of something 
considered as its foundation” or “the principal component of 
something.”54 This definition neither leads to the automatic 
assumption that “because of” and “on the basis of” have the same 
definition, nor the determination that it indicates a sole cause 
analysis. The use of the words “foundation” and “component” 
indicate that when something is a “basis,” it is one part of a whole—
not a “sole”55 cause. Therefore, this definition seems to lean towards 
an interpretation that a disability must only be a contributing cause, 
as opposed to a but-for cause.56 
With this analysis, the Fourth Circuit determined that Congress’s 
2008 amendment resulted in no meaningful difference in the statutory 
terms of the ADA.57 Yet it seems incredibly unlikely that Congress 
would have changed this language for no purpose. As noted in the 
Sixth Circuit’s ADA causation analysis, “[d]ifferent words usually 
convey different meanings .	.	.	.”58 Given the importance of, and 
weight given to, the language used in a statute when determining 
what causation standard to apply in the previous court decisions cited 
 
 50. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236. 
 51. Id. at 236 (citing Basis, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010); On 
the basis of, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ADVANCED LEARNER’S ENGLISH DICTIONARY 
(2008) (defining “on the basis of” as “according to[,] based on”)). 
 52. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236. 
 53. Id. at 235–36. 
 54. Definition of Basis, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/basis [https://perma.cc/39Z8-7CNE]. 
 55. Definition of Sole, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/sole [http://perma.cc/KB7S-2GRZ] (“belonging exclusively or otherwise 
limited to one usually specified individual, unit, or group”). 
 56. See Corey Stein, Comment, Mixed-Motive Jury Instructions Under the ADA and 
ADAAA: Are they Still Applicable in the Wake of Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 
and University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar?, 44 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1223, 1251 (2014) (“[T]he plain language of the phrase ‘on the basis of’ is 
significantly broader than the phrase ‘because of’ .	.	.	.”). 
 57. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235–36 (“We see no ‘meaningful textual difference’ 
between this language and the terms ‘because of’ .	.	.	.”). 
 58. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 315 (6th Cir. 2012). 
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by the Fourth Circuit,59 the Fourth Circuit’s brief, two-sentence 
analysis of this point appears deficient.60 
To strengthen its argument, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that 
the amendments to the ADA occurred prior to the decision in Gross, 
which held that the “because of” language in the ADEA required a 
“but-for” causation standard.61 Since Gross had not yet been decided, 
the court reasoned, Congress’s 2008 amendment to the ADA cannot 
be said to have been an effort to avoid a “but-for” causation 
standard.62 The relevance of this argument, however, seems 
questionable given that the ADEA has a “because of” standard, 
which the Fourth Circuit interpreted as having the same exact 
meaning as the “on the basis of” language. And more importantly, 
this chronology does not preclude an argument that the change in 
language was meant to prevent an application of a “but-for” 
causation standard, as Congress could have had other reasons other 
than the decision in Gross for enacting such change. 
B. Legislative History of the 1991 ADA 
Aside from a brief mention of the legislative history behind the 
2008 ADA amendments, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Gentry 
largely ignored the legislative history of the original 1991 ADA.63 The 
Fourth Circuit likely overlooked this analysis due to its quick 
determination that “on the basis of” exactly mirrored “because of” 
language and, therefore, a “but-for” causation standard was 
applicable.64 
In fact, the legislative history that the Fourth Circuit cited 
explains why the “on the basis of” language implies a causation 
standard less than “but-for” causation. In its analysis, the Fourth 
Circuit briefly looked to the legislative history of Congress’ 
enactment of the amended language to the ADA.65 In that history, 
Congress explicitly stated that such amendments were undertaken to 
 
 59. This seems particularly true given the amount of weight and how closely the 
Fourth Circuit followed the Supreme Court decision in Gross, which is a decision that was 
almost entirely based on the analysis of the ADEA’s “because of” language. See Gross v. 
FBL Fin. Servs, Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175–78 (2009); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 480 U.S. 
228, 240–42 (1989); Lewis, 681 F.3d at 312. 
 60. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235–36; see also Stein, supra note 56, at 1251. 
 61. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id.  
 64. See id. 
 65. Id.  
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ensure[] that the emphasis in questions of disability 
discrimination is properly on the critical inquiry of whether a 
qualified person has been discriminated against on the basis of 
disability, and not unduly focused on the preliminary question 
of whether a particular person is a “person with a disability.”66 
From this passage alone, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the only 
overarching goal of amending the ADA was to “decrease the 
emphasis” courts had previously placed on whether someone has a 
disability.67 Therefore, this change in language should not be 
interpreted as an attempt to “lower the causation standard.”68 
However, this short passage overlooks other key provisions in 
the ADA’s text and legislative history. First, another provision in the 
amended ADA states that one of the purposes of the amendments 
was to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection to be available under 
the ADA.”69 Yet, the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the ADA 
calls for a “but-for” causation standard appears to go against this 
explicitly stated purpose.70 Because a “but-for” causation standard is 
more difficult to establish than a motivating factor standard, this test 
imposes a significantly greater burden on plaintiffs alleging 
discrimination based on their disabilities who will feel the burden of 
the “but-for” causation standard. As a result, fewer plaintiffs will be 
able to effectively establish their claims, and many victims of 
discrimination may choose not to file suit in the first place. The scope 
of the ADA will not have been broadened, but instead narrowed, as 
fewer people claiming discrimination based on their disability will be 
protected by the courts. 
Additionally, the House Report associated with this change in 
language states that 
the bill amends Section 102 of the ADA to mirror the structure 
of nondiscrimination protection in Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, changing the language of Section 102(a) from 
prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual “with a 
disability because of the disability of such individual” to 
 
 66. 154 CONG. REC. S8843 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (statement of Senate Managers) 
(providing the purpose and summary of the legislation, in addition to explanations of the 
bill, how the law applies to the legislative branch, and a regulatory impact statement). 
 67. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 236. 
 68. Id. 
 69. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §	2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554 (emphasis added). 
 70. Id. §	2(a)(4). For full analysis of why a “but-for” causation standard does not 
provide for a “broad scope” of protection, see infra Part IV. 
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prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual “on the 
basis of disability.”71 
This language indicates that the intent of Congress was to broaden 
the scope of ADA protection. Not only would a “but-for” causation 
standard make it increasingly difficult for ADA claims to be brought72 
in contrast to Congress’s intent of broadening the scope of protection 
through its amendments to the ADA,73 but determining that “on the 
basis of” is the equivalent to “because of” statutory language conflicts 
with the House Report. The change in language was meant to “mirror 
the structure of nondiscrimination protection” under Title VII, which 
employs the motivating factor” standard.74 By holding that “on the 
basis of” requires but-for causation, the Fourth Circuit directly 
contravened Congress’s clear intent to apply the motivating factor 
causation standard to the ADA. This oversight indicates that the 
Fourth Circuit should have more thoroughly analyzed the legislative 
history,75 particularly given the arguably ambiguous language of the 
amendments to the ADA and the importance of the precise statutory 
language to the court’s analysis.76  
Additionally, the context in which the ADA was enacted is also 
indicative of this same congressional intent. The ADA was enacted 
merely one year after the 1989 Price Waterhouse decision established 
that the “because of” language in Title VII required a motivating 
factor causation standard.77 Consequently, when choosing the 
wording of the ADA, Congress was aware that the Supreme Court 
had interpreted the “because of” language to establish a motivating 
factor causation standard with respect to Title VII. Thus, Congress’s 
decision to use identical language to that of Title VII further bolsters 
the likelihood the ADA was enacted to establish the same motivating 
factor standard analyzed in Price Waterhouse.78 
 
 71. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008). 
 72. See infra Part IV. 
 73. Gentry v. E.W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 236 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 74. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 16 (2008). 
 75. United States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (“Where the 
language and purpose of the questioned statute .	.	. [is] ambiguous, the judiciary may 
properly use the legislative history to reach a conclusion.”). 
 76. See supra Section III.A (explaining how the “on the basis of” language could have 
been construed to mean something other than “but-for” causation which the Fourth 
Circuit did not consider). 
 77. Price Waterhouse was decided in 1989 and the ADA was originally enacted in 
1990. See supra Part I. 
 78. Id. 
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This conclusion is further evidenced by the amendments made to 
Title VII in 1991. Congress amended Title VII to explicitly state that 
a motivating factor standard should be used, statutorily linking the 
ADA and Title VII.79 A 1990 House Report about the amendments 
to Title VII and the ADA stated: 
[a] bill is currently pending in the Judiciary and Education and 
Labor Committees, H.R. 4000, which would amend the powers, 
remedies and procedures of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Because of the cross-reference to title VII in Section 107, 
any amendments to title VII that may be made in H.R. 4000 or 
in any other bill would be fully applicable to the ADA.80 
This of course suggests that Congress knew these amendments were 
being made to Title VII and fully intended, through the statutory link 
between the two statutes, that the “motivating factor” causation 
standard apply to the ADA.81 Since Congress intended for the 
motivating factor standard to apply to the ADA when it was first 
enacted, this strongly suggests that a motivating factor standard is 
what Congress had always intended for the ADA. 
In sum, the Fourth Circuit only undertook an analysis of one part 
of the legislative history relating to the ADA, not fully examining 
Congress’ intent behind the amendments and ignoring any other 
relevant legislative history. Had it fully examined such history, the 
court could have uncovered the House Reports, the legislative history 
surrounding the implementation of the ADA in 1990, the 
amendments to Title VII in 1991, and the legislative history of the 
2008 amendments to the ADA noted above. 
While these congressional materials do not definitely establish a 
particular causation standard for ADA cases, they at least tend to 
lean away from the use of a “but-for” causation standard. Therefore, 
the brevity and lack of depth to the Fourth Circuit’s analysis of the 
legislative history of the ADA does not allow for a complete and 
proper analysis of what causation standard should be used under the 
new ADA. The assumption that the new language did not require any 
additional analysis prevented the Fourth Circuit from fully exploring 
what “on the basis of” means and how legislative history should 
inform what causation standard should be applied. However, even 
 
 79. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234. 
 80. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 at 48 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
445, 471; see also infra Section III.C. 
 81. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 at 48 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
471. 
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accepting the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that Congress merely 
intended the “on the basis of” language to mirror “because of” 
language, the court still should not have applied a “but-for” causation 
standard for other reasons. 
C. Precedent and the Lack of Motivating Factor Language 
Another major influence that led the Fourth Circuit to require a 
“but-for” causation standard was the lack of “motivating factor” 
language in the 2008 ADA amendments.82 This conclusion was largely 
based upon Gross, in which the Supreme Court held that the 
ADEA’s “because of” language did not explicitly provide that a 
plaintiff may establish discrimination by showing that age was simply 
a “motivating factor,” as the statute included “because of” language.83 
The Gross Court also noted that Congress did not add a “motivating 
factor” provision to the ADEA when it amended Title VII, leading 
the Court to conclude that “when Congress amends one statutory 
provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted 
intentionally.”84 
In support of its heavy reliance on Gross, the Fourth Circuit 
noted that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had previously applied 
Gross to ADA claims and found that the “motivating factor” 
standard of Title VII could not be applied to such claims.85 According 
to the Sixth Circuit, “[s]hared statutory purposes do not invariably 
lead to shared statutory texts, and in the end it is the text that 
matters,” and thus, because the text of the ADA makes no mention 
of a “motivating factor,” the causation standard from Title VII could 
not be read into the statute.86 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit held that 
“given the lack of a provision in the ADA recognizing mixed-motive 
claims, such [mixed motive finding] claims do not entitle a plaintiff to 
relief for disability discrimination.”87 However, like the Fourth Circuit 
in Gentry, neither of these courts considered the fact that the ADA 
includes a cross-reference to the substantive provisions of Title VII—
that the ADEA does not—and merely adopted their ADA analysis 
from a case analyzing the ADEA. 
 
 82. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234 (“We conclude that Title VII’s ‘motivation factor’ 
language cannot be read into Title I of the ADA.”). 
 83. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009). 
 84. Id. at 174. 
 85. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234. 
 86. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 87. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F. 3d 957, 964 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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The Fourth Circuit used the criteria espoused in Gross to 
determine whether the amended ADA required a “but-for” causation 
standard.88 The court held that the “motivating factor” causation 
standard could not be applied because the provisions of the amended 
ADA did not explicitly provide that a plaintiff could establish 
discrimination by showing that disability was a “motivating factor.”89 
Similarly, the Court noted that Congress “contemporaneously 
amended” provisions of the ADA at the time the motivating factor 
standard was added to Title VII but failed to make any such 
amendments to the ADA.90 This analysis, taken from Gross, ignores 
important differences between the ADEA and the ADA—an issue 
the Supreme Court itself warned against in Gross.91 Whereas the 
ADEA was enacted without any cross-reference to the substantive 
provisions of Title VII, the ADA has such a cross-reference.92 These 
factors therefore merit a different approach for ADA cases and 
ADEA cases when analyzing the absence of “motivating factor” 
language. 
The original ADA’s cross-reference to Title VII is significant to 
this analysis, as it works to incorporate substantive portions of Title 
VII into the amendments to the ADA. This incorporation provides 
an important explanation for the lack of “motivating factor” language 
in the statute and the lack of amendment of the ADA in 1991. The 
ADA’s “enforcement” provision incorporates Title VII, stating: “The 
powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in Sections 2000e-4, 
2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 shall be the powers, remedies, 
and procedures this subchapter provides .	.	. to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability .	.	.	.”93 The Fourth Circuit 
argued that this merely incorporates Title VII’s “enforcement 
provisions” and not the “unlawful employment practices” in §	200e-
2—the portion of Title VII establishing the “motivating factor” 
causation standard.94 But even though §	2000e-2(m) is not directly 
incorporated into the ADA, it is incorporated through §	2000e-
5(g)(2)(B), which states, “[o]n a claim in which an individual proves a 
 
 88. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 234. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009) (“When conducting 
statutory interpretation, ‘we must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.’	”). 
 92. 42 U.S.C. §	12117(a) (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. §	621–634 (containing no cross-
references to the substantive provisions of Title VII). 
 93. 42 U.S.C. §	12117(a). 
 94. See Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235. 
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violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent 
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action 
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor .	.	.	.”95 
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged the connection to §§	2000e-
2(m) through 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) but argued that §	2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
merely incorporates the remedies available under §	2000e-2(m), 
holding that to invoke a claim under the ADA “an ADA plaintiff 
must allege a violation of the ADA itself.”96 While the Fourth Circuit 
makes a valid contention, the mixed motive causation standard used 
in Title VII is a stronger argument. For one, if §	2000e-2(m) does not 
apply to the ADA, then the link has provided a remedy with no way 
to establish liability.97 Arguably, §	2000e-5(g)(2)(B) only provides 
remedies for liability established under §	2000e-2(m).98 This link 
Congress created must have been purposeful. If the remedies can only 
be applied to violations of §	2000e-2(m), the logical conclusion is that 
§	2000e-2(m) must also be incorporated into the ADA for the 
remedies to apply. This would also explain why Congress did not 
explicitly include motivating factor language in the ADA if it 
intended it to be incorporated through this connection with Title VII. 
As for the argument that Congress had a clear opportunity to 
amend the language of the ADA at the time it amended the language 
in Title VII to include “motivating factor,” the House Report implies 
that Congress considered this but determined that it was unnecessary 
because any changes made to Title VII would also apply to the 
ADA.99 Therefore, the fact that the ADA was not 
contemporaneously amended with Title VII does not carry as much 
weight in the case of the ADA as it may have had in the ADEA 
analysis in Gross. Although there are questions as to what exactly 
Congress intended, when cross-referencing the ADA with the 
enforcement provision of Title VII, it seems that this cross-reference 
was meant to connect the ADA and Title VII in some way—a 
reference that does not exist in the ADEA. Based on these facts, in its 
analysis of the ADA, the Fourth Circuit too quickly used the 
 
 95. 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(g)(2)(B)/ 
 96. Gentry, 816 F.3d at 235. 
 97. See Stein, supra note 56, at 1241 (“If §	2000e-2(m) was not intended to apply to 
the ADA, then there would have been no need to link the ADA to the remedy established 
under §	2000e-5(g)(2)(B) with no means of obtaining the remedy provided therein.”). 
 98. The statute itself, 42 U.S.C. §	2000e-5(g)(2)(B), states that “[o]n a claim in which 
an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) .	.	. [,]” which would lead one to 
believe that the statute only applies to §	2000e-2(m) violations, not violations of the ADA. 
 99. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3 at 48 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
471. 
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standards the Gross Court used in its analysis of the ADEA, given 
that the two statutes are inherently different. 
IV.  HANDLING THE EFFECTS OF A “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION 
STANDARD 
Due to attempts by advocacy groups, communities, and the 
independent living movement to eliminate social barriers for 
individuals with disabilities, Congress enacted the ADA in 1990 as 
the nation’s first civil rights law highlighting the needs of people with 
disabilities by explicitly prohibiting discrimination based on disability 
in public accommodations, telecommunications, public services, and 
employment.100 The ADA was guided by the overarching goal of 
assuring “equality of opportunity, full participation, independent 
living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.”101 These 
guiding principles were carried into the ADA’s amendment in 2008.102 
Aside from the argument that a “but-for” causation standard is not 
the appropriate standard based on the text of the statute and its 
legislative history, the requirement of a “but-for” causation standard 
to establish a claim of disability discrimination would directly 
contravene the purpose behind the implementation of the ADA. 
The “but-for” causation standard requires more than just 
showing that an employer fired an employee because that employee 
has a disability.103 While a plaintiff may prove that she was fired due 
to her disability, her proven claim is not synonymous with a finding 
that she was discriminated against because of her disability, unless she 
can prove that she would not have had adverse employment action 
taken against her had she not been disabled.104 Not only does this 
requirement not comport with the very purposes laid out in the 
ADA,105 it seemingly contravenes the policy behind its 2008 
 
 100. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, §	2, 104 Stat. 
328, 328–29 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §	12101 (2012)). 
 101. Id. §	2(a)(8). 
 102. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §	2(b)(1), 122 Stat. 3553, 
3554 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §	12101 (2012)) (stating that the purpose of the amendment 
was to “reinstat[e] a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA”). 
 103. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 3, at 266 (defining “but-for” causation as follows: 
“The defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but 
for that conduct; conversely, the defendant’s conduct is not a cause of the event, if the 
event would have occurred without it.”). 
 104. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 323–24 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining in detail the difficulty for a 
plaintiff trying to establish but-for causation for the adverse employment action taken 
against them). 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 65–68. 
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amendments. Congress was disillusioned with how narrowly the 
ADA had been applied in Supreme Court cases and sought to fix the 
issues and broaden the scope of protection the ADA would provide 
through the 2008 amendments.106 
By applying a “but-for” causation standard, the Fourth Circuit 
has made plaintiffs’ claims of employment discrimination based on 
disability more difficult to establish. Therefore, the accountability of 
employers in making employment decisions is diminished.107 As long 
as an employer is able to establish another reason for the termination 
of the employee, the fact that discrimination based on an employee’s 
disability has occurred becomes a non-issue. Additionally, a plaintiff 
is put in a position where she is expected to find “objective evidence 
of her employer’s state of mind or internal burdens” to prove “but-
for” causation.108 More often than not, it will be close to impossible to 
find this evidence, thereby leaving plaintiffs to attempt to make a 
“conjectural inquiry of the employer’s thoughts and purposes.”109 The 
employer is then in the position to merely reject that the disability 
was the but-for cause of any adverse employment actions and offer 
any other “subjective” reason for those actions.110 The Supreme Court 
itself has acknowledged this issue and seemed to believe that it would 
be contrary to our common sense that “Congress meant to obligate a 
plaintiff to identify the precise causal role played by legitimate and 
illegitimate motivations in the employment decisions [a plaintiff] 
challenges.”111 Requiring the “but-for” causation standard puts the 
employer in a stronger position than the employee, making it 
significantly more difficult to establish a claim of discrimination based 
on disability in the workplace. These difficulties will make it harder 
 
 106. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 §	2(a)(4). For a discussion on why Congress made 
amendments to the ADA, see supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
 107. See Brian Joggerst, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Mixed Motives 
Claims Under the ADA: Consistent, Congruent, and Necessary, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1587, 1612 (2014) (arguing that if a “but for” standard is used, an employer who admits to 
using forbidden discriminatory factors in its employment decision will not be liable if a 
jury thinks that the same decision would have been made absent the forbidden factor). 
 108. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 323 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. 
 111. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989); see also Gross v. FBL Fin. 
Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 191 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o apply ‘but-for’ 
causation is to engage in a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the 
employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been different. The answer to this 
hypothetical inquiry will often be far from obvious, and, since the employee likely knows 
less than does the employer about what the employer was thinking at the time, the 
employer will often be in a stronger position than the employee to provide the answer.”). 
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for a plaintiff to make a claim of discrimination based on disability 
and may even result in fewer claims being brought.112 
The difficulties a plaintiff faces when forced to meet a “but-for” 
causation standard would be avoided under a “motivating factor” 
standard. The plaintiff would still have to establish the discrimination 
but would merely have to show that it was a motivating factor, even if 
other factors also led to the adverse employment action.113 Therefore, 
a defending employer would not escape liability by merely claiming 
an alternative reason for the firing while in court when a motivation 
of the termination was the plaintiff’s disability. Given the strong 
policy implications behind the enactment of the ADA, which were 
strengthened with its 2008 amendments, the “but-for” causation 
standard hinders the goals of the ADA. As a result, the Fourth 
Circuit has placed a higher burden on those discriminated against 
because of their disability than Congress had intended. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Fourth Circuit held that a “but-for” causation 
standard was the appropriate standard required to establish a claim of 
discrimination under the ADA, it is most likely not the causation 
standard Congress intended to require for ADA claims. The Fourth 
Circuit too quickly dismissed the idea that claims brought under the 
amended ADA should be evaluated using a “motivating factor” 
standard. Merely brushing aside the change in language that the 
amendments implemented, the Fourth Circuit only briefly considered 
the legislative history and adhered to holdings in previous court cases, 
which linked “because of” language to but-for causation. Whether the 
amended language in the ADAAA was meant to mirror “because of” 
language or not, the Fourth Circuit’s analysis is lacking. Its decision to 
hold plaintiffs to a “but-for” causation standard does not comport 
with the policy behind the implementation of the ADA. Requiring a 
“but-for” causation standard as the Fourth Circuit does will make 
plaintiffs’ claims of discrimination based on disability more difficult to 
bring, contravening Congress’ intentions of enacting the ADA and 
the amendments to it in 2008. A “motivating factor” standard would 
provide the protection that Congress intended and persons with 
 
 112. Mook, supra note 2 (“The Gentry decision, therefore, represents a significant 
victory for employers in fending off ADA claims. Had the Fourth Circuit adopted Title 
VII’s ‘motivating factor’ analysis for the ADAAA’s causation standard, a plaintiff would 
have to show only that his or her disability was one of the considerations that the 
employer took into account when taking an adverse job action.”). 
 113. See supra Part I. 
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disabilities deserve. For these reason, it may be necessary for 
Congress to pass another amendment to the ADA clearly laying out 
to the lower courts that a “motivating factor” standard is required in 
ADA discrimination claims. 
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